Large language model (LLM) agents deployed in safety-critical domains are increasingly governed by symbolic constraints compiled from domain knowledge bases. We identify and formalise a failure mode of this design, which we term WikiBreach: an agent output passes every symbolic predicate check while pragmatically conveying the content that the constraint was written to prohibit. We define WikiBreach as the conjunction of five predicates—symbolic pass, semantic relevance, user-specific application, operationalisation of prohibited management, and absence of adequate escalation—and organise eight evasion strategies against the symbolic blind spot each exploits. We release WikiBreach-v1, a benchmark of 1540 samples derived from the Prolog safety rules of a deployed General Practitioner agent, and evaluate a layered semantic audit pipeline against four baselines and three prevalence-aware trivial baselines. Two findings follow. First, F1 is unsuitable at the prevalence typical of red-teaming benchmarks: an all-positive classifier attains a higher F1 than any method evaluated, and measured by the Matthews correlation coefficient no baseline separates breaches from hard negatives to a useful degree (MCC ≤ +0.130). Second, the user-application predicate carries the discriminative burden: an ablation in which it is computed but not enforced attains MCC +0.107, whereas enforcing it as a gate attains +0.444 and reduces false positives on hard negatives from 0.835 to 0.271. On the multi-turn subset the proposed state tracker attains MCC +0.431 where the NLI baseline attains −0.184 at identical recall. We present the framework as a safety auditing instrument rather than a deployable filter.



